In this paper we formulate and solve a distributed binary hypothesis-testing problem. We consider a cooperative team that consists of two decision makers (DM'S); one is refered to as the primary DM and the other as the consulting DM. The team objective is to carry out binary hypothesis testing based upon uncertain measurements. The primary DM can declare his decision based only on its own measurements; however, in ambiguous situations the primary DM can ask the consulting DM for an opinion and it incurs a communications cost. Then the consulting DM transmits either a definite recommendation or pleads ignorance. The primary DM has the responsibility of making a fmal definitive decision. The team objective is the minimization of the probability of error, taking into account different costs for hypothesis misclassification and communication costs. Numerical results are included to demonstrate the dependence of the different decision thresholds on the problem parameters, including different perceptions of the prior information.
Introduction and Motivation. hypothesis-testing problem which is an abstraction of a wide class of
In this paper we formulate, solve, and analyze a distributed team decision problems. It represents a normative version of the "second-opinion" problem in which a primary decision maker (DM) has the option of soliciting, at a cost, the opinion of a -5 DM when faced with an ambiguous interpretation of uncertain evidence.
Motivating ExamDleS,
Our major motivation for this research is provided by generic hypothesis-testing problems in the field of Command and Control. To be'specific, consl'dir the problem of target detection formalized as a binary hypothesis testing problem ( H, means no target, while H, denotes the presense of a target ). Suppose that independent noisy measurements are obtained by two geographically distributed sensors (Figure 1 ). One sensor, the primary DM, has final responsibility for declaring the presense or absence of a target, with different costs associated with the probability of false alarm versus the probability of missed detection. If the primary DM relied only on the measurements of his own sensor, then we have a classical centralized detection problem that has been extensively analyzed; see, for example, Van Trees [l] . If the actual measurements of the second sensor were communicated to the primary DM, we have once more a classical centralized detection problem in which we have two independent measurements on the same hypothesis; in this case, we require communication of raw data and this is expensive both from a channel bandwidth point of view and, perhaps more importantly, because radio or acoustic communication can be intercepted by the enemy.
Continuing with the target detection problem, we can anive at the model that we shall use in the sequel by making the following assumptions which model the desire to communicate as little as possible. The primary DM can look at the data from his own sensor and attempt to anive at a decision using a likelihood-ratio test (kt), which yields a threshold test in the linear-Gaussian case. Quite often the primary DM can be confident about the quality of his decision. However, we can imagine that there will be instances that the data will be close to the decision threshold, corresponding to an ambiguous situation for the primary DM. In such cases it may pay off to incur a communications cost and seek some information from the other available sensor. It remains to establish what is the nature of the information to be m m i t t e d back to.the primary DM. In our model, we assume the exlstence of a consulting DM having access to the data from the other sensor. We assume that the consulting DM has the ability to map the raw data from his sensor into decisions. The consulting DM is "activated" only at the request of the primary DM. It is natural to speculate that its advise will be ternary in nature: YES, I think there is a target; NO, I do not think there is a target; and, SORRY, NOT SURE MYSELF. Note that these transmitted decisions in general require less bits than the raw sensor data, hence the communication is cheap and more likely to escape enemy interception. Then, the primary DM based upon the message received from the consulting DM has the responsibility of making the final binary team decision on whether the target is present or absent.
The need for communicating with small-bit messages can be appreciated if we think of detecting an enemy submarine using passive sonar (Figure 2) . We associate the primary DM with an attack submarine, and the consulting DM with a surface destroyer. Both have Request for information from the submarine to the destroyer can be towed-array sonar capable of long-range enemy submarine detection.
initiated by having the sub eject a slotbuoy with a prerecorded low-power radio message. A short active sonar pulse can be used to transmit the recommendation from the destroyer to the submarine. Thus, the submarine has the choice of obtaining a "second opinion" with minimal compromise of its covert mission.
Of course, target detection is only an example of more general binary hypothesis-testing problems. Hence, one can readily extend the basic distributed team decision problem setup to other situations. For example, in the area of medical diagnosis we imagine a primary physician interpreting the outcomes of several tests. In case of doubt, he sends the patient to another consulting physician for other tests ( at a dollar cost ), and seeks his recommendation. However, the primary physician has the frnal diagnostic responsibility. Similar scenarios occur in the intelligence field where the "compartmentalization'' of sensitive data, or the protection of a spy, dictate infrequent and low-bit communications. In more general military Command and Control problems, we seek insi ht on formalizing the need to break EMCON, and at what cost, to rcsofve tactical situation assessment ambiguities.
Literature Review,
The solution of distributed decision problems is quite a bit different, and much more difficult, as compared to their centralized counterparts. Indeed there is only a handful of papers that deal with solutions to distributed hypothesis-testing problems. The frst attempt to illustrate the difficulties of dealing with distributed hypothesis-testing problems was published by Tenney The numerical sensitivity results ( summarized in Section 5 ) for the linear-Gaussian case provide much needed intuitive understanding of the problem and concrete evidence that the team members operate in a more-or-less intuitive manner, especially after the fact. We study the impact of changing the communications cost and the measurement accuracy of each DM upon the decision thresholds and the overall team performance. In this manner we can obtain valuable insight on the optimal communication frequency between the DM's. As to be expected, as the communication cost increases, the frequency of communication (and asking for a second opinion) decreases, and the team performance approaches that of the primary DM operating in isolation. In addition, we compare the overall distributed team performance to the centralized version of the problem in which the primary DM had access, at no cost, to both sets of observations. In this manner, we can study the degree of inherent performance degradation to be expected as a consequence of enforcing the distributed decision architecture in the overall decision making process.
Finally, we study the team performance degradation when one of the team members, either the primary or the consulting DM, has an erroneous estimate of the hypotheses prior probabilities. This corresponds to mildly different mental models of the prior situation assesment; see Athans [ 121. As expected the team performance is much more sensitive to misperceptions by the primary DM as compared to similar misperceptions by the consulting DM. This implies that, if team training reduces misperceptions on the part of the DM'S, the greatest payoff is obtained in training the primary DM.
Problem Definition
The problem is one of hypothesis testing. The team has to choose among two alternative hypotheses H,, and HI, with a priori probabilities Each of two DM's, one called primary (DM A) and one consulting (DM B), receives an uncertain measurement y, and yg respectively (Figure l), distributed with known joint probability density functions 3 ).
The final decision of the team uf (0 or 1, indicating H, or H, to be true) is the responsibility of the primary DM. DM A initially makes a preliminary decision u , where it can either decide (0 or 1) on the basis of its own data (ie y,), or at a cost ((20) can solicit DM B's opinion (u,=I), prior to m a h g the commital decision.
The consulting DM'S decision up consists of three distinct messages (call them : x,v and z) and is activated only when asked. We decided to assign a messages to DM B, because we wanted to have one message indicating each of the two hypotheses and one message indicating that the consulting DM is 'not sure.' In fact, we proved that the optimal content for the messages of DM B is the one mentioned above.
When the message from DM B is received,the burden shifts back to the primary DM, which is called to make the commital decision of the team based on his own data and the information from the consulting DM.
We now define the following cost function :
J : {O,l}x{Ho,H1} + R J(uf,HJ ; otherwise The cost structure of the problem is the usual cost structure used in with :
Hypothesis Testing problems, but also includes the non-negative communication cost, which the team incurs when the DM A decides to obtain the consulting DM'S information. Remark : According to the rules of the problem, when the preliminary decision u, of the primary DM is 0 or 1, then the final team decision is 0 or 1 respectively ( ie P(u+ 1 u,=i)=l for i=O,1 ).
The objective of the decision strategies will be to minimize the expected cost incurred where the minimization is over the decision rules of the two DMs. Note that the decision rule of the consulting DM is implicitly included in the cost function, through the final team decision uf (which is a function of the decision of the consulting DM).
All the prior information is known to both DMs. The only information they do not share is their observations. Each DM knows only its own observation and, because of the conditional independence assumption, nothing about the other DM'S observation.
€YC&ZL Given po, pl, the distributions P(y,,yp I HJ for i=O,1 with yac Y,, yps Yp, and the cost function J*, find the decision rules u,,ua and uf as functions min EIJ*(u,,uf,W1
The problem can now be stated as follows :
r p : Yp -+ {x,v,zI
and (subject to : P(u+ 1 u,=i)=l for i=O,l), which minimize the expected cost. NOTE : The centralized counterpart of the problem, where a single DM receives both observations is a well known problem. The solution is deterministic and given by a likelihood ratio test ( l r t ) . That is : (O,H,) . Thus, the difficulty of our problem arises because of its decentralized natux.
We will show that, under certain assumptions, the most restrictive of which is conditional independence of the observations, the optimal decision rules for the Problem are deterministic and given by lrt's with constant thresholds. The thresholds of the two DMs are coupled, indicating that the DMs work as a team rather than individuals.
About the Solution to the General Problem
In order to be able to solve the Problem , we make the following assumptions.
or it is more costly for the team to err than to be correct. This logical assumption is made in order to motivate the team members to avoid erring and in order to enable us to algebraically put the optimal decisions in lrt form.
A S S W O N 2 : P@, lyp,Hi) = P@, 15) and P(yp ly,,HJ = P@p IHi) ; i=OJ (15) or the observations y, and yp are conditionally independent. This assumption removes the dependence of the one observation on the other and thus allows us to write the optimal decision rules as lrt's with constant thresholds. ASSUMPTION 3 : Without loss of PeneraliQ assume that : P(up=x lu,=IJ31) P(u -v ju,=I3,) P(up=z Ju,=IJ31) This assumption is made in &der to disimguish between the messages of DM B.
The optimal decision rules for all three decisions of our problem (ua, 
A Gaussian Example
We now present detailed threshold equations for the case where the probability distributions of the two observations are Gaussian. We selected the Gaussian distribution, despite its cumbersome algebraic formulae, because of its generality. Our objective is to perform numerical sensitivity analysis to the solqtion of this example, in order to gain information on the team 'activities.
We assume that the observations are dismbuted with the following Gaussian distributions : 
The two alternative hypotheses are :
Without loss of generality, assume that :
Po Fl (21) The rest of the notation is the same as in the general problem described above.
We can show that the optimum decision rules for this example are given by thresholds on the observation axes, as shown in Figure 3 . In (26) and (27) the arimarv DM is the one of Corollarv 1 and that the decision rule emiloyed b y the~consulting DM is thd one of Corollary 2, then the optimal decision rule for the preliminary decision u, of the primary DM is a deterministic function defied by : a "centralized' part Cy,') indicating the relation of our problem to its centralized counterpart.
U 8 B A S E L I N E P A R A R E T E R S
I 0 if yaIY,' ya(y,) = I if Y $ < Y~I Y $(33)
NUMERICAL SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
We now perform sensitivity analysis to the solution of the Gaussian example. Our objective is to analyze the effects on the team performance from varying the parameters of our problem, in order to obtain better understanding of the decentralized team decision mechanism. We vary the quality of the observations of each DM (the variance of each DM), the a priori likelihood of the hypotheses and the communication cast
Finally, we study the effects of different a priori knowledge for each DM.
We use the following 'minimum error' cost function :
We do not need to vary the cost function, because this would be mathematically equivalent to varying the a priori probabilities of the two hypotheses. As the variance of the primary DM increases, it becomes less costly for the team to have the primary DM always decide the likely hypothesis, than request for information. This occurs becayse the observation of DM A becomes increasingly worthless. Thus, the primary DM progressively ignores its observation and in order to minimize cost has to choose between "de facto" deciding the more likely hypothesis (and incuring cost equal to the probability of the least likely hypothesis) or "de facto" requesting for information (and thus incuring the communication cost plus the cost of the consulting DM). In this case, the prior is less than the latter and so the optimum decision of the primary DM, as its variance tends to infinity is to always decide the more likely hypothesis (Figure 4 , Po= .8). Thus :
We distinguish two cases depending on the cost associated with the lim P(ua=I) + 0 o(+-Moreover, the percentage gain in cost achieved by the team of DMs, relative to the cost incured by a single DM obtaining a single observation, assymptotically goes to 0, as the variance of the primary DM goes to infinity (Figure 5 , Po= .8 ).
An interesting insight can be obtained from Figure 5 (Po= .8) . As the variance of the primary DM increases the percentage improvement in cost (defined above) is initially increasing and then decreasing assymptotically to zero. The reason for this is that for very small variances, the observations of the primary DM are so good that it does not need the information of the consulting DM. As the variance increases, the primary DM makes better use of the information and so the percentage improvement increases. But, at a certain point as the quality of the observations worsens, the primary DM finds less costly to start declaring more often the likely hypothesis (ie to bias its decision towards the more likely hypothesis) than requesting for information, for reasons mentioned above, and so the percentage improvement from then on decreases. CASE 2 ; min(Po,l-Po) > C1* + C With reasoning similar to the above, we obtain that (Figure 4 , Po= .5) :
lim P(u,=I) + 1 Moreover, the percentage improvement is sbictly increasing (and keeps incresing to a precomptutable limit ; Figure 5 , Po= S). This reinforces the last point we made in (Case 1) above. Since in the present case it is always less costly for the primary DM to request and use the 
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information than to bias its decision towards the more likely hypothesis, the percentage improvement curve does not exhibit the non-monotonic behavior observed in (Case 1) above ( where Po= .8).
a Effects of varvine the of the observations of the Consultine DM As the variance of the consulting DM'S observations increases, less information is requested by the primary DM, that is the primary DM'S upper and lower thresholds move closer to each other ( Figure 6 ). This is something we expected, since information of lesser quality is less profitable (Gore cosay) to the team of DMs.
We should note here that the thresholds of a DM is an alternative way of representing the probabilities of the DM'S decisions, since the decision regions are characterized by the thresholds. For example :
The thresholds of the consulting DM demonstrate some interesting points of the team behavior (Figure 7 ) . For small values of the variance they are very close together, as the quality of the observations is very good and so the consulting DM is willing to make the final team decision. As the variance increases, DM B becomes more willing to return up=? (i.e. "I am not sure") and let DM A make the final team decision. As the variance continues to increase, the thresholds of the consulting DM converge again. It might seem counter-intuitive, but there is a simple explanation. The consulting DM recognizes that the primary DM, despite knowing that the quality of the consulting DM'S information is bad, is willing to incur the communication cost to obtain the information. This indicates that the primary DM is 'confused', that is, the a posteriori probabilities of the two hypotheses (given its observation) are very close together. Hense, the consulting DM becomes more willing to make the final decision. After a certain point (og2=62.4) the primary DM does find it worthwhile to request for infbrmation at ~LI.
REMARK ; Note in Figure 7 that the thresholds of the consulting DM converee to 1 which would have been the maximum likelihood threshbid had the a priori probabilities of the two hypotheses been w. But, the a priori probabilities which the consulting DM uses in its calculations are functions of the given a priori probabilities (ie pi) and the fact that the primary DM requested for information (ie P(u,=I I Hi) ). In fact, the consulting DM uses as its a priori probabilities its c P O P(ua=I I H) H From the above, we deduce that for large variances (oa2=62) the estimates, of the consulting DM, for the a posteriori probabilities of the primary DM are very close to .5, reenforcing our point about the primary DM "being confused."
Finally, it is clear, that as the variance of the consulting DM increases, the percentage gain in cost, achieved by the team of DMs, decreases to 0, since the primary DM eventually makes all the decisions alone (cen&ed). (Figure 9 ) and the more often "I am not sure" is returned by DM B (Figure 10 ). This is understandable, because the closer po is to 0.5, the bigger the a priori uncertainty. Consequently, the percentage improvement achieved by the team of the DMs is monotonically increasing with po from 0 to 0.5 and monotonically decreasing from 0.5 to 1. 5.5 Effects of imperfect a p -CASE 1 ; Only the consulting DM knows the true po From Figure 11 , where the true po is 0.8, we deduce that our model is relatively robust. If the primary DM'S erroneous po is anywhere between 0.7 and 0.9, performance of the team will be not more than 10% away from the optimum.
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CASE2: Only the primary DM knows the m e po
As we see in Figure 12 , where the true po is 0.8, our model exhibits remarkable robustness qualities. If the consulting DM's erroneous po is as far out as 0.01, the performance of the team will not be further than 7% away from the optimal. This can be explained by looking at the consulting DM's thresholds as functions of po ( Figure 13 ). We observe that for values of po between 0.01 and 0.99, the thresholds do not change by much. This occurs because, as explained in detail in 5.2 above, the consulting DM knows that the primary DM requests for information when its a posteriori probabilities of the two hypotheses are roughly equal, which is the case indeed.
As already stated, the consulting DM uses as its a priori probabilities its estimates of the a posteriori probabilities of the primary DM. Therefore, the consulting DM'S estimates of the primary DM's a posteriori probabilities are good, besides the discrepancy in po, and the team's performance is not tampered by much. 
